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Who Pays for Pensions in the State and 
Local Sector: Workers or Employers?* 
RONALD G. EHRENBEBG 
ROBERT S. S M I T H 
Cornell University 
Introduction 
In 1974 Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA). This complex piece of legislation, which applies only to 
private-sector pension plans, contains several provisions which tend to 
increase employers' costs of providing pensions. These include liberal-
ized vesting rules, stringent funding requirements, and increased fidu-
ciary responsibility and accountability. The analysis in this paper will 
focus on the likely effect of these provisions if they are applied to state 
and local government employee retirement systems. Although a public-
sector variant of ERISA has yet to be passed, public employee retire-
ment systems have recently become subject to scrutiny by various gov-
ernmental bodies. Partly because of fiscal crises at the state and local 
level, and partly because of ERISA's passage, investigations have been 
launched to ascertain the need for pension reform legislation in the 
public sector. Whether prepared at the federal, state, or local level, 
the resulting reports invariably call for important reform of public-
sector pensions, notably in the area of funding.1 
As with any piece of social legislation, a public-sector variant of 
ERISA is likely to have costs as well as benefits, and it is reasonable to 
inquire what the magnitudes of these costs are likely to be.2 Turning 
first to ERISA's vesting provisions, vesting provisions are currently much 
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1
 See, for example, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and 
Labor, Pension Task Force Report on Public Employee Retirement Systems (Wash-
ington: 1978). 
2
 See Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, "A Framework for Evaluating 
State and Local Government Pension Reform," in Public Sector Labor Markets, eds. 
Peter Mieszkowski and George Peterson (Washington: 1979) for a more extensive 
discussion of the costs of ERISA-type legislation in the private and public sectors. 
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more liberal in the public sector than they were in the pre-ERISA 
private sector; for example, only 2.4 percent of state and local govern-
ment employees are in plans with no vesting. Indeed, the House Pension 
Task Force concluded that applying ERISA-type vesting provisions to 
the state and local sector would require vesting changes for only 20 
percent of employees in the sector and would not prove extremely 
costly.3 Our own estimates, based upon regression analyses of the effect 
of pension plan characteristics on normal costs (for retirement systems 
in Pennsylvania, the only state to publish actuarial information for its 
public pension plans), support this view.4 We calculate that adoption 
of ERISA-type vesting requirements in the state and local sector would 
increase per-worker pension costs by roughly 2.5 percent; these costs 
would not be distributed uniformly across systems, but would be con-
centrated in those systems which initially had less generous vesting pro-
visions. 
In contrast, applying ERISA funding requirements to the state and 
local sector would be enormously costly because of the very poor fund-
ing practices which currently exist. The Pension Task Force estimates 
that 75 percent of public employers are not currently funding at the 
levels required by ERISA, that assets are equal to 38 percent of ac-
crued liabilities in the typical fund, and that the average funding de-
ficiency is about $16,000 per worker.5 While the Pension Task Force did 
not estimate the increases in yearly pension costs ERISA funding pro-
visions would require, actuarially-based data from Pennsylvania's munic-
ipal employees' retirement systems suggest that they would be substan-
tial. Unfunded liabilities for nonuniformed employees in the typical 
Pennsylvania city are around $15,000 per worker—very close to the 
estimated national average. If cities had to make pension contributions 
which cover normal costs and amortize unfunded liabilities over 30 
years, the average city contribution per year would have to rise by 
$585 per worker. This sum would increase their current contribution of 
$657 per worker by 89 percent! 
Who Pays for Pensions in the State and Local Sectors?8 
Given the likely magnitude of the costs of pension reform in the 
state and local sector, the next issue is how these costs will be dis-
tributed across taxpayers and various groups of public employees. This 
3
 U.S. House of Representatives, pp. 88-89. 
4
 See Ehrenberg and Smith, especially Appendix A, for details. 
5
 U.S. House of Representatives, pp. 51, 157, 165. 
'' Due to space constraints, our discussion is necessarily brief here. See Ehrenberg 
and Smith for details. 
r 
PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 59 
requires one to first have information on how much of the added pen-
sion costs will be paid for by employees in the form of lower wages. 
Once the impact of pension reform costs on wages are known, increases 
in unit labor costs can be calculated. These calculations can then be 
combined with public-sector labor demand elasticities to yield estimates 
of employment changes and revenue needs. Because estimates of public-
sector labor demand elasticities already exist, our research has focused 
on the extent to which pension costs are reflected in public-sector 
salaries.7 
Most pension plans in the public sector are defined benefit pension 
plans, are quite complex, and contain numerous provisions (e.g., age 
and service requirements for regular retirement, vesting rules, benefit 
E levels, employee contribution rates).8 Fortunately, in most cases it is 
| straightforward to calculate how changing a provision will alter the net 
| contribution a government employer must make to an employee's pen-
sion fund account each period to keep it fully funded.9 For example, 
increasing employees' required contribution rates will decrease the em-
t ployer's net pension costs, while increasing the level of retirement bene-
I fits will increase the employer's net pension costs. 
j To the extent that one can control for other factors that would cause 
i public-sector wage scales to vary across cities, higher employer net 
j pension costs should in theory be associated with lower public em-
i ployee wage scales. Estimation of an equation in which public em-
ployee wage scales are regressed on retirement system characteristics 
and variables that previous studies have shown influence public em-
ployee wages permits one to ascertain whether public employers actu-
ally do shift the cost of pensions on to their employees.10 
' The discussion above is couched in terms of a fully funded public-
sector retirement system. The effects of underfunding on public-sector 
wages depend on employers' and employees' perceptions about the out-
come of underfunding. The possible cases are discussed below. 
Employers may regard underfunding as merely borrowing from the 
future—that is, creating a future liability with a present value equal 
1
 See Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "The Demand for State and Local Government Em-
ployees," American Economic Review 63 (June 1973), pp. 363-79, for estimates 
of public-sector wage elasticities of demand. 
8
 See U.S. House of Representatives for a more complete enumeration of these 
provisions and the frequency with which they occur. 
" Burt S. Barnow and Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "The Costs of Defined Benefit Pension 
Plans and Firm Adjustments," Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (November 1979), 
present examples of such calculations. 
10
 See Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Gerald S. Goldstein, "A Model of Public Sector 
Wage Determination," Journal of Urban Economics 2 (February 1975), for an 
analysis of the other factors that affect public-sector wages. 
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to the amount of underfunding. With this perception they would not 
be willing to offer higher wages in the event of underfunding. We 
would thus observe no wage-underfunding trade-off. 
Public-sector employers, however, may regard underfunding as cost-
saving, at least to the currently elected administration. They may, for 
example, believe that higher levels of government will "bail-out" funds 
whose pensioners face nonreceipt of benefits. They may also reason that 
the financial crisis is 15 to 20 years in the future and therefore well 
past the time when they will be in office. In either case, employers re-
garding underfunding as cost-saving will be willing to pay higher wages 
if they choose to underfund. The ultimate wage-underfunding trade-off, 
however, depends on employee perceptions. 
If employees are unaware of underfunding or believe it will have no 
effect on their expected pension benefits, they will essentially ignore 
underfunding in their choice of employers and go for the highest pay-
ing job (ceteris paribus). The highest wages, other things equal, will 
be paid by the biggest underfunders. Large-scale underfunders would 
dominate in their ability to attract employees and a Gresham's Law of 
pensions would exist: poorly funded retirement systems would drive 
out well funded ones. We would observe near-total underfunding by 
all public employers. 
If employees are aware of underfunding and perceive it to reduce 
their expected benefits, they would demand higher wages to compen-
sate for additional underfunding. Employees who require a large wage 
increase for a given increment of underfunding would choose to work 
for the better-funded employers, while those who require only a small 
wage increase would work for the poorest funders. We would observe 
both a positive wage-underfunding trade-off in the labor market and 
the coexistence of retirement systems in which funding practices vary 
widely. In fact, this is the only case where a wage-underfunding trade-
off would be observed; in the other cases employers are either unwill-
ing to make the trade-off or are clustered at some near-maximum level 
of underfunding. 
Attempts to ascertain empirically the extent to which our theoreti-
cal predictions are borne out about the effects of public-sector retire-
ment system characteristics and funding practices on state and local 
government employees' wages are limited by numerous troubling data 
problems.11 Nevertheless, within the limits of available data, we have 
conducted three tests of whether a trade-off exists between wages and 
retirement system characteristics in the public sector. Details of these 
11
 See Ehrenberg and Smith for a detailed discussion of these problems. 
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analyses are presented elsewhere, we merely summarize some of the 
more important findings here.12 
Ehrenberg used data on police and firefighters in roughly 130 cities 
of populations of 50,000 or more, drawn from the 1973 International 
City Management Association survey of "Personnel Practices in Mu-
nicipal Police and Fire Departments" and other sources, to test for the 
effects of several pension plan characteristics—minimum age and ser-
vice requirements for regular retirement, percentage of salary received 
for regular retirement, and employees' pension contributions as a frac-
tion of their salary-^-on public-sector wages. His strongest finding was 
that, holding promised pension benefits and other variables expected 
to affect wages constant, police and firefighters appear to be fully com-
pensated in the form of higher wages, on virtually a dollar-for-dollar 
basis for increases in their own pension contributions. He also per-
formed a limited analysis of the effect of underfunding on wages, find-
ing that a set of proxy variables for the extent of underfunding was 
correlated with wages. Those results are suggestive of the existence 
of a positive association between the extent of underfunding and wages, 
although no quantitative estimates of the relationship were obtained.13 
In the same paper, Ehrenberg also analyzed data from the U.S. Con-
ference of Mayors' "Third National Survey of Employee Benefits for 
Full-Time Personnel of U.S. Municipalities" on 262 cities with popula-
tions of 25,000 or over to test for wage-retirement system characteris-
tics trade-offs among fire, police, and sanitation workers. Perhaps his 
most important finding was that, ceteris paribus, the presence of vest-
ing led to a 3-9 percent decrease in wages. 
Finally, Smith tested the predictions of the theory on data for non-
uniformed employees enrolled in Pennsylvania's city and county retire-
ment systems. These data are the only available public-sector re-
tirement system data that include actuarial calculations (in particular, 
calculations of the "normal cost of pension promises" and the extent 
of underfunding). Smith found that, ceteris paribus, increases in nor-
mal service costs reduce wages virtually dollar-for-dollar and increases 
12
 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "Retirement System Characteristics and Compensating 
Wage Differentials in the Public Sector," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
(forthcoming) and Robert S. Smith, "Pensions, Underfunding, and Wages in the 
Public Sector" (mimeo, March 1979). 
13
 The ICMA data set was the only one of the three we analyzed which contained 
information on collective bargaining status. Since the effect of public-sector unions 
on the wage-retirement system trade-off is of interest in its own right, we should 
note that these data indicated that, holding retirement system characteristics and 
other determinants of wages constant, police wages were some 3 to 5 percent higher 
and firefighter wages some 4 to 10 percent higher in cities in which wages were 
determined by formal union negotiations. 
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in the extent of underfunding increase wages, again virtually dollar-
for-dollar. 
Who Wi l l Pay for Pension Reform in the Public Sector? 
Our findings, summarized above, suggest we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that the costs of pension reform legislation in the public sector 
will be borne completely by public employees in the form of downward 
pressures on their salaries. This raises the issue of who pension reform 
will benefit. For example, some workers may prefer higher current 
wages to vesting reforms, either because they plan to stay in the job 
until retirement or because they will quit any job before becoming 
vested. To require that all plans vest in 10 years, for example, would 
eliminate the option of working for higher-wage employers with il-
liberal or nonexistent vesting. Such losses, however, would be small in 
the aggregate because of the nearly complete level of vesting which 
exists currently in the public sector. 
The implications of our findings for funding reform policies are 
probably more worthy of careful discussion because of the large costs 
involved. Our evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that employees 
are reasonably well informed of underfunding and they are fully com-
pensated for it at the margin. One can surmise that, at the margin, they 
are willing to take a gamble on receiving a pension if the current wage 
is high enough. Mandated full funding would remove this option from 
their choice set and would reduce their utility. 
The gamble appears attractive to employees because the chances 
are good that political pressure to bail-out bankrupt funds will be ef-
fective. The thought of retirees being unable to receive pension checks 
due to the irresponsible funding policies of some previous administra-
tion is politically intolerable, no matter how strong the evidence is that 
these retirees were previously compensated for the risk of this eventu-
ality. Herein lies one possible justification for this reform. Rather than 
protecting workers, the reform may be most useful in protecting the 
public from having to pay for underfunding twice: once in the form 
of higher wages and once at the time of bail-out. 
Assuming that policy-makers judge funding reform to be desirable, 
at least three possible policy options appear to exist. First, one might 
require all state and local government retirement systems to amortize 
their existing unfunded liabilities over a specified period of time (say 
30 years) and to fully fund new liabilities. Since current and future 
employees will pay the cost of full funding, in the form of lower wages, 
requiring that all current unfunded liabilities be amortized would place 
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a heavy burden on younger and prospective employees. These em-
ployees would in effect be required to pay for the pensions of older 
employees—the very ones, if our evidence is correct, who have re-
ceived wage premiums to compensate them for underfunding over the 
years. 
Second, one might argue on equity grounds that the full funding 
requirements should apply only for liabilities incurred after the date 
of any new legislation. This would necessitate the creation of new funds 
which all current employees could be required to join. Existing under-
funded pension funds might be closed down and current and future 
retirees paid their pro rata share of the assets. Such a scheme would 
have the benefit of not placing the burden of funding current unfunded 
liabilities on future generations of public employees; however, it would 
substantially reduce the well-being of current employees and retirees 
who belong to retirement systems with unfunded liabilities (it also is 
illegal in most states). While one might be tempted to argue that our 
results suggest that these individuals already have been compensated 
for the possibility of such an action occurring, replication of our re-
sults by other investigators is required before this option can be seri-
ously considered. 
Finally, one might require that public employee retirement systems 
fully fund future pension liabilities, but that existing unfunded liabili-
ties be financed out of more general revenue sources, either at the state 
or federal level. Such a policy would shift the burden of current un-
funded liabilities to taxpayers in general and, to the extent that un-
funded liabilities vary across states and federal funding is opted for, 
would have distributional implications across geographic areas. 
